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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: 
A VIEW OF INTENT AND PRACTICE 
DANIEL A. DREYFUS* and HELEN M. INGRAM** 
INTRODUCTION 
Policy performance usually falls short of policy promise. Creative 
and innovative intentions boldly stated in the preambles of legisla­
tion become diluted and deferred in the practical chore of translating 
what legislatures say into what government does. Causes for the per­
formance gap are legion, and any policy which aims at innovative 
change is bound to face frustration in application. However, the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 1 is an exception 
to the general rule that the targets and goals of the formulators of 
policy ebb away as the implementors take over. In NEPA's case, the 
objectives were expanded during implementation, and the impact of 
the Act was enhanced beyond initial expectations. 
Participants in the legislative process did not generally agree that 
the passage of NEPA would have much positive impact upon public 
policy. Contemporary documents reveal that the Nixon administra­
. tion had aggressively opposed enactment of the measure throughout 
the legislative process, and the President's signature on January I, 
1970, was a belated and lukewarm acquiescence to growing national 
concern with the environment. Most members of Congress, more­
over, probably did not appreciate the potential scope and signif­
icance of the measure. The news media and environmental interest 
groups displayed little appreciation for the portent of the legislation. 
The New York Times of January 2, 1970, for example, barely noted 
the new requirement for preparation of environmental impact state­
ments, and a headline referred to Senator Henry M. Jackson as 
"Sponsor of Pollution Control Bill." 
In place of the attrition of commitment which usually occurs in 
implementation, this article argues that the goals of NEPA have been 
reinterpreted and in many ways extended beyond those intended by 
the sponsors. The thousands of column inches of public praise or 
*Deputy Staff Director for Legislation, Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
U.S. Congress. 
**Associate Professor, Dep't. of Political Science and Director, Institute of Government 
Research, Univ. of Ariz. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., 83 Sat. 852 (1970).
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vilification of NEPA printed since 1970 and the volumes of legal 
arguments, judicial opinions, and administrative rules and regulations 
dedicated to its interpretation are testimony to its significance. As 
this essay and the ones which follow in this symposium issue 
indicate, there is a good deal of disagreement among NEPA scholars 
about the locus and extent of the impact. There is little question, 
though, that NEPA has changed the influence of participants in 
environmental policymaking. 
Indeed, as the other four contributions on NEPA demonstrate, the 
most fruitful and interesting subject for research is not simply 
whether NEPA is being implemented, but how the law has affected 
who participates and with what leverage in decisionmaking. A prelim­
inary subject to be addressed here is how the uniquely aggressive 
implementation of NEPA came about. 
The purposes of this introductory essay are twofold. First, the aim 
is to revisit the legislative process, to recreate the decisionmaking 
context, and to recall the motives and intentions of several key legis­
lative actors. We have a privileged perspective for this task. One of 
the authors writes from the vantage point of a staff member of the 
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and one of two key 
aides to Senator Jackson during the formulation of NEPA legislation. 
Second, this article will comment upon events-again from the frame 
of reference of a close observer and staff participant with some 
insight into congressional intent-which have occurred in a half 
dozen years of implementation. 
CONTEXT OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
The context and orientation of the legislative process is ordinarily 
remedial. It aims to correct an ill or to restructure or replace a 
sagging institution. Commentators on NEPA have combed the public 
record in vain for extensive future-oriented analysis by participants 
of how the mechanisms and institutions to be established by the law 
should operate.2 Far more fruitful for unraveling the legislative 
intents of NEPA are the participants' perceptions and diagnoses of 
the ailments of existing institutions and mechanisms. Remarking on 
the extent to which the existing decisionmaking context dominated 
Congressional consideration of NEPA, Frederick R. Anderson ob­
served: 
... the largest portion of NEPA's legislative history is taken up with 
establishing the dynamics of environmental systems, diagnosing the 
2. R. Liroff, NEPA and Its Aftermath: The Formation of a National Policy for the Envi­
ronment, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern, 1975).
extent of environmental harm insofar as it is known (and calling for 
study and measurement of what is not yet known), identifying the 
federal institutional shortcomings which contribute to environ­
mental deterioration, and endorsing the need for comprehensive 
federal planning, coordination and decisionmaking under a unified 
national policy. The subject of enforcement of such a policy on the 
working level in federal agencies did not command Congress' full 
attention at any point.3 
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The context in which the National Environmental Policy Act was 
formulated was one in which economic management had long been 
an accepted government function. An essential objective of govern­
ment throughout the history of the U.S. had been to promote 
economic growth. Early frontier expansionism had been replaced by 
the progressive conservation ethic of the l 900's, which espoused wise 
use of natural resources. Sustained yield and public stewardship had 
replaced exploitation, but the goal of management, both public and 
private, was still economic gain. Even the preservationists of the 
l 950's and l 960's did not challenge the ascendency of economics as 
it applied to most issues. They simply maintained that some places 
had very great value which was difficult to quantify. 
The idea incorporated in the policy statement of NEPA that valu­
able economic opportunity might in some instances be foregone in 
order to achieve an environmental goal was a significant shift of 
policy premises. Such a revolution in values applied to government 
decisionmaking would require an extraordinary mechanism to dis­
play and weigh environmental effects of proposed actions, just as 
economic effects had long been considered. 
The National Environmental Policy Act was formulated within a 
context of widely-shared criticism of administrative fragmentation in 
the handling of natural resources and the environment. The Hoover 
Commission had long since identified and deplored the conflicting 
and overlapping missions of myriad agencies and bureaus dealing 
with natural resources. The solution proposed then, and again seri­
ously considered by the Eisenhower administration, was a Depart­
ment of Natural Resources.4 
In the late l 960's, when NEPA was debated, the vanguard con­
cerned with environmental policy added ecological irrationality to 
the case against executive branch fragmentation. Criticis of existing 
governmental machinery realized that every decision-to grant re-
3. F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the National Environmental
Policy Act 1 (1973). 
4. Mister Z, The Case for a Department of Natural Resources, 1 Nat. Res. J. 197-206
(1961). 
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search funds, to construct a public works project, to lease public 
lands-has environmental implications. They noted that the impact 
of government upon the environment was in fact comprehensive, but 
administrative treatment was piecemeal. The mission of each agency 
was narrowly defined and responsive to some specific federal con­
cern, such as proprietorship over public lands and navigable waters or 
interstate or international aspects of fisheries and game management. 
The newer environmentally-oriented functions of air and water pollu­
tion control were equally narrowly assigned and were primarily a 
response to crisis situations which had not been adequately treated 
by state and local government. 
The challenge was to approach environmental management in a 
comprehensive way. The new values of environmental policy had to 
intrude somehow into the most remote recesses of the federal admin­
istrative machinery and begin to influence the multitude of decisions 
being made by thousands of officials. The functions of government 
involved were too diverse to be unified organizationally. Imposing a 
comprehensive policy within the organizational arrangement was the 
ambition which Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) had for environ­
mental impact statements. In a floor speech insisting upon the Senate 
version of the measure, which established the impact statement 
procedure, Jackson said: 
There are about 80 major Federal agencies with programs under 
way which affect the quality of the human environment. If environ­
mental policy is to become more than rhetoric, and if the studies 
and advice of any high-level, advisory group are to be translated into 
action, each of these agencies must be enabled and directed to par­
ticipate in active and objective-oriented environmental management. 
Concern for environmental quality must be made part of every 
Federal action. 5 
Serious shortcomings in environmental information and a lack of 
established legitimacy in environmental expertise were recognized as 
other impediments to environmental decisionmaking. Traditionally, 
economic impacts of resource development decisions were well docu­
mented in justification, but decisionmakers were supplied very little 
information about environmental impacts. One of the charges raised 
by conservationists in preservation battles, for example, Echo Park 
and the Grand Canyon Dam controversy, was that agencies such as 
the Park Service or the Fish and Wildlife Service, which might be 
expected to generate information, were muzzled by department 
5. 115 Cong. Rec. 29087 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
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secretaries.6 Further, decisionmakers had far less respect for environ­
mental information than for economic data, which were clothed in 
the accepted benefit-cost analysis and backed by established rules 
and procedures. 
The need for sounder environmental information was identified 
repeatedly at the joint House-Senate colloquium to discuss a national 
policy for the environment held in July 1968. For instance, Law­
rence Rockefeller observed: 
The area where greater knowledge would help is the resource deci­
sion-making process. Many federal resource decisions are still made 
on a benefit-cost ratio which does not adequately reflect environ­
mental factors. We know-or are told-precisely what the dollar 
benefits are for flood control, irrigation, or highway traffic-but no 
one can tell us the cost of various alternatives in long-term environ­
mental values. 7 
The environmental impact statement mechanism was relied upon 
by the authors of NEPA to alter the existing decisionmaking context, 
so that henceforth environmental effects might be assigned greater 
significance in decisionmaking. 
GENESIS OF NEPA 
Perhaps it is an exaggeration to say that "nothing is new under the 
sun," but the policymaking process certainly draws heavily for its 
raw material upon concepts which have been employed before. There 
are several impediments to original ideas in policymaking, aside from 
the obvious scarcity of creative genius which plagues all forms of 
human endeavor. Public policymaking imposes decisionmaking costs. 
There is brisk competition for the time and energies of principal 
decisionmakers, and they cannot afford to invent new techniques for 
every problem. Furthermore, concepts which are familiar are easily 
communicated, while departures must be described in tedious detail 
in the course of legislative debate. Once a policy approach has been 
put into practice, a body of experience is acquired which serves as a 
referent for further applications of the same or similar techniques. In 
any event, if sufficient inquiry is made, most policy concepts can be 
identified as extensions or adaptations of approaches which have 
been used before. 
6. 0. Stratton & P. Sirotkin, The Echo Park Controversy (1959); H. Ingram, Patterns of 
Politics in Water Resource Development: A Case Study of New Mexico's Role in the Colo­
rado River Basin Bill (1969). 
7. Hearings of the Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for the
Environment, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and the House 
Comm. on Science and Aeronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1968). 
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There are three distinct parts to NEPA; each was conceived sepa­
rately and derived from separate sources. They are: 
1. Establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality (Title II)
2. An explicit declarationof a national environmental policy (Sec­
tion 101)
3. A direction to all agencies of the federal government to carry out
certain functions-the "action-forcing mechanism" (Sections 102
through 105)
Council on Environmental Quality 
The phylogeny of the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
can be traced directly to the model of the Employment Act of 1946, 
which established the Council of Economic Advisors to the Pres­
ident. 8 The 1946 Act was a formal recognition of the government's 
responsibility for maintenance of economic health and for the eco­
nomic impacts of its activities. Over the years national economic 
efficiency was established as an objective for a wide range of govern­
mental programs. Basic economic data were collected, and economic 
criteria were established to evaluate projects. Establishment of the 
Council of Economic Advisors symbolized this development and pro­
vided an institutional mechanism for monitoring economic well­
being. 
The Resource and Conservation Act, proposed in 19 59, was a 
direct, section-by-section parallel to the Employment Act. Sponsored 
by Senator Murray, the bill declared "a national policy on conserva­
tion, development, and the utilization of natural resources and for 
other purposes."9 It required an annual Presidential Resources and
Conservation Report, establishment of a Council of Resources and 
Conservation Advisors to the President, and organization of a Joint 
Congressional Committee on Resources and Conservation. 
Substantial considerations supported application of economic 
policy approaches to environmental management. Environment, like 
economics, pervades governmental actions. The aim of the proposed 
Resources and Conservation Act was to give similar legitimacy to 
environmental concerns and to provide continuing review of the 
cumulative impact of federal actions upon environmental matters. Of 
course, in 1960 environment was very narrowly defined to include 
only recreational, wildlife, scenic, and scientific values and enhance­
ment of the national heritage for future generations. 
No action was taken on Senator Murray's bill, but the concepts 
8. Employment Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § § 1021-25 (1964).
9. S. 2549, 8th Cong. (1959).
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were perpetuated in various forms, and ultimately some of them 
became the major legislative objectives of both the Jackson bills and 
Congressman John Dingell's (D-Mich.) House companion measure. 
The notion of a presidential advisory council or board and the annual 
report remained a central theme of the NEPA bills of the 91 st Con­
gress. A joint committee on environment was proposed and nearly 
established in 1970 but was not a part of successful NEPA measures. 
The structure and functions of the CEQ were major questions in 
the legislative history of NEPA. The Nixon administration preferred 
its own small advisory body in the executive office. Congressman 
Dingell and Senator Jackson were committed to a body with suffi­
cient stature to be influential in the executive branch and with 
sufficient staff capability to monitor and advise upon the state of the 
environment. 
National Environmental Policy 
The Murray bill, after the fashion of the Employment Act, began 
with a short statement of national policy. As enacted in NEPA, the 
statements of goals and objectives were a good deal more sophis­
ticated. The essential building blocks of an environmental policy 
statement, though not widely discussed, were articulated by the 
environmental vanguard throughout the l 960's. Professor Lynton 
Caldwell as early as 1963 had suggested "environmental administra­
tion" as the focus for public policy. He noted that: 
Examination of the recent literature of human ecology, public 
health, natural resources management, urbanism and development 
planning suggests a growing tendency to see environment as a policy 
framework within which many specific problems can be solved. 1 0 
In 1965 the President's Science Advisory Committee also recog­
nized broad political and social implications for environmental affairs 
and suggested that environmental quality was a citizen's right. 1 1 
An unusual Senate-House colloquium, held during 1968 to discuss 
a national policy for the environment, marked an important step in 
the evolution of an environmental policy statement. The Congres­
sional co-chairmen, Senator Henry Jackson and Congressman George 
P. Miller, invited legislators, administrators, academics, and well­
known citizens interested in the environment to attend. While there
was little agreement about the scope of federal concern and less upon
10. L. Caldwell, Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy, 23 Pub. Ad. Rev. 138 
(Sept. 196 3 ). 
11. President's Science Advisory Committee, Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,
Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel 16 (The White House 1965). 
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the form which federal environmental management should take, 
there was a consensus that a more explicit expression of federal 
attitude toward the environment was desirable.' 2 
The impetus given an explicit policy statement in the colloquium 
was extended in the consideration of Senate Bill 1075, introduced by 
Senator Jackson and others in the 91 st Congress. As introduced, 
Senate Bill 107 5 was limited. It would have established an advisory 
Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the 
President, required an annual environmental quality report, and 
vested in the Council certain broad environmental data-gathering 
functions. Similar measures were under consideration in the House, 
including House Resolution 6750, formulated by Congressman John 
Dingell, which became the center of House action on NEPA. Both 
the Jackson and Dingell bills were designed to favor the jurisdiction 
of their respective committees. The Senate bill referred to the 
Department of the Interior under the jurisdiction of the Senate 
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, and the House bill was intro­
duced as amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act 
under the purview of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Commit­
tee.' 3 
During the Senate hearings key legislators became convinced of 
the need for a strong policy statement. Dr. Lynton Caldwell strongly 
recommended that an explicit statutory policy on environmental 
management be included in the bill. Following the hearing, the 
Senate Interior staff worked out an amendment to Senate Bill 1075 
which contained a declaration of national environmental policy; the 
amendment was enacted in section 101. Specifically, the federal 
government is instructed to protect and restore the environment in 
accordance with a general national policy-declared by the act-that 
government shall endeavor "to create and maintain conditions under 
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony." One provi­
sion in the amendment which did not survive the House-Senate 
conference in its original form stated: "The Congress recognizes that 
each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthy 
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute 
to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."14 
Though eventually stricken on the ground that its vagueness might 
12. Hearings of the Joint House-Senate Colloquium, supra note 7. 
13. Jurisdictional disputes imposed restraints upon the NEPA proposals throughout the 
legislative process. Congressional committees handled the environment in a fragmented 
manner (as did the administration); a large number of committees could, therefore, logically 
assert dominion. 
14. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969). 
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invite endless litigation, the provision is indicative of the sponsors' 
policy objectives. 
Environmental Impact Statements 
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) were invented in response 
to the anticipated administrative indifference or outright hostility 
toward the environmental council and the environmental policy 
statement. During the hearings on Senate Bill l 07 5 it became clear 
that while the administration professed full concurrence with the 
objectives of environmental management, it in fact recommended 
against enactment of the measures then sponsored. Dr. Lee 
DuBridge, the President's Science Advisor and the administration's 
principal spokesman at the Interior Committee's hearing, proposed 
the alternative of establishing a committee of selected cabinet mem­
bers under presidential leadership to deal with environmental 
issues. 1 5 Interrogation by committee members developed the fact 
that the proposed cabinet council would have little or no full-time 
staff support. 
After the hearings Senator Jackson discussed with the committee 
staff his concern that if the legislation were enacted over the adminis­
tration's opposition, the newly formed Council on Environmental 
Quality would be unlikely to enjoy strong presidential support. Some 
other institutional arrangement seemed to be needed. He instructed 
the staff to explore the concept, suggested by Dr. Lynton Caldwell 
during Senate hearings, of incorporating "action-forcing" mechan­
isms into the bill. In part, Dr. Caldwell suggested: 
... Congress should at least consider measures to require the Federal 
agencies, in submitting proposals, to contain within the proposals an 
evaluation of the effect of these proposals upon the state of the 
environment. 1 6 
Building upon Dr. Caldwell's idea, language was drafted which would 
grant authority to every federal agency to implement the environ­
mental policy act as part of its established responsibilities. 
As reported by the Interior Committee, Senate Bill 107 5 included 
the requirement that every recommendation or report on proposals 
for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment include a finding by the 
responsible official that the environmental impacts of the proposed 
action had been studied, that unavoidable adverse impacts were 
15. Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71-73 (1969). 
16. Id. at 116.
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justified by other stated considerations of national policy, that long 
term resource considerations had been evaluated, and that irrevers­
ible and irretrievable commitments of resources were warranted. If 
proposals involved unresolved environmental conflicts, alternatives 
were to be studied, developed and described. In other words, what­
ever the principal objective of the proposed action, the agency would 
be required to explore the environmental consequences and expose 
them to the consideration of any subsequent reviewers. 
The measure passed the Senate, as amended by the Interior 
Committee with the environmental findings provision, on July l 0, 
1969, without significant debate. The ease of Senate passage was, 
however, deceptive. Later in the legislative process jurisdictional and 
substantive conflicts arose in both the House and the Senate. 
Congressman Dingell's companion version in the House included a 
very brief policy statement, requirement of an annual environmental 
report, and establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality. 
There was no language in the House measure regarding impact state­
ments or other action-forcing provisions. It passed by a vote of 372 
to 15 on September 23, 1969, but not without several important 
concessions obtained by Congressman Aspinall (D-Colo.), Chairman 
of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. In recognition of 
the overlapping interests of Aspinall's Interior Committee with the 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, he was granted a position 
on the conference committee, where he acted as a restraining force. 
He also succeeded in inserting an important amendment which 
affected the substance of the legislation. It stated that "nothing in 
the Act shall increase, decrease, or change any responsibility of any 
Federal official or agency." Had this provision not been modified by 
conference and its effects mitigated by the language of the confer­
ence report, this amendment would have negated the action-forcing 
mechanism. 
In the Senate a heated substantive and jurisdictional controversy 
between the Interior and the Public Works Committees had to be 
bargained to terms before the conference. In contrast to the House 
settlement of the jurisdictional dispute, no members of the Senate 
Public Works Committee were appointed as conferees on Senate Bill 
1075. Instead, Senator Jackson agreed to support in conference 
several changes in the measure which had been negotiated between 
himself and Senator Muskie (D-Me.), the spokesman for the Public 
Works Committee viewpoint. Two significant modifications were 
made in the "action-forcing" provisions: 
1. The requirement for a formal finding of environmental impact
was changed to a "detailed statement" by the responsible official.
2. A provision was added to require consultation with environ­
mental agencies in the development of environmental impact
statements and to make explicit that such statements would be
public documents widely available.
59 
The negotiations among adversaries-both principals and staff­
leading to this settlement and several others affecting other parts of 
the bill were protracted and bitter. The bases of disagreement are 
complex and multifaceted and are only sparsely displayed in the 
public record. 1 7 The substance of the Muskie objection to the "find­
ing" requirement was that it would be difficult to challenge. He 
doubted that an environmental finding declared by federal agencies 
would be reliable. Muskie stated: 
The concept of self-policing by Federal agencies which pollute or 
license pollution is contrary to the philosophy and intent of existing 
environmental quality legislation. In hearing after hearing agencies of 
the Federal Government have argued that their primary authoriza­
tion, whether it be maintenance of the navigable waters by the Corps 
of Engineers or licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic 
Energy Commission, takes precedence over water quality require­
ments. 
I repeat, these agencies have always emphasized their primary 
responsibilities making environmental considerations secondary in 
their view. 1 8 
The essence of the Muskie insistence upon interagency review of 
impact statements was a desire to extend and protect the authority 
of the environmental agencies under the jurisdiction of his Public 
Works Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. As he said on the 
Senate floor: 
The requirement that established environmental agencies be con­
sulted and that their comments accompany any such report would, 
place the environmental control responsibility where it should be.19 
The result of the compromise version was to reduce the solemnity 
of the official's responsibility to consider environmental implications 
and to substitute greater outside sanctions-criticisms by other agen­
cies, court challenges, or public opinion-to enforce NEPA policies. 
Few significant changes were made in environmental impact state­
ment provisions by the conference committee, and the compromise 
was embodied in Section l 02 as enacted. 
17. For a detailed discussion of the Muskie-Jackson negotiations see T. Finn, Conflict
and Compromise: Congress Makes a Law, The Passage of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown 1972). 
18. 115 Cong. Rec. 29053 (1969) (Remarks of Sen. Muskie).
19. Id.
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THE INTENT OF CONGRESS CONCERNING SECTION 102 
Since NEPA was enacted, endless hours of intellectual effort have 
been invested by solicitors of federal agencies, nonfederal litigants 
and potential litigants, and judges and their law clerks in trying to 
divine the intent of Congress from the sketchy documentation of 
legislative history. The pursuit of "congressional intent," however 
seriously it may be approached, has been about as scientific as the 
voodoo practice of reading the future in a random pile of chicken 
bones. 
Clearly, no one can say except a presiding judge-and that because 
of authority rather than special insight-what the intent of Congress 
was with respect to Section 102. There were many House and Senate 
participants in the legislative process, and each had diverse interests 
and perspectives; it would be impossible to unravel their separate 
intentions. At the same time, Senator Jackson's Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee staff prepared the original draft of Section 102 
and participated in the later process of modifications. Therefore, the 
recollections of a staff member-along with consideration of the 
record-may afford some useful insight. 
Above all, the impact statement was not intended merely to pro­
vide data or description, but to force a change in the administrative 
decisions affecting the environment. It was conceived as an action­
forcing mechanism and consistently described as such by its pro­
ponents. Emphasis-perhaps over-emphasis-upon environmental con­
cerns was considered a necessary means of instilling the new policy 
into an uncongenial decisionmaking process in which the support of 
the administration was uncertain and federal agencies were wedded 
to their own missions and to economic efficiency. 
The principal staff members who drafted Section 1022 0 combined 
two viewpoints-that of a lawyer with an appreciation for the role of 
the courts in policymaking, and that of a student of administration 
and practitioner of bureaucratic infighting. Both perspectives were 
useful in designing incentives and recognizing disincentives to operate 
under Section 102. 
It is axiomatic that nearly any significant proposal will face com­
petition for allocation of scarce resources. There are more actions 
proposed than federal agencies can possibly undertake, and at each 
stage of the bureaucratic decision process there is a need to eliminate 
some proposals. The decisionmaker must have criteria upon which 
such eliminations can be based, and it was NEPA's action-forcing 
intent to introduce new criteria. Consequently, a proposal accom-
20. William J. Van Ness Jr. and Daniel Dreyfus.
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panied by an environmental horror story should carry a heavy handi­
cap in the competition. Given a choice, an administrator is unlikely 
to stake the agency's program upon proposals which must carry such 
liabilities throughout the remaining review process and which face 
public and political opposition as well. 
The temptation for agency officials to understate the adverse 
environmental consequences of favorite proposals was recognized. 
Here the role of legal review was to be critical. Preparation of the 
environmental impact statement was to be a statutory requirement. 
There is no question that the original drafters of Senate Bill l 075 
contemplated a role for the courts. The threat of litigation was 
intended as an incentive to agencies to make a fair appraisal. The 
requirement for interagency review comment was a further guarantee 
against excessive agency bias. The members and staffs of both the 
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs and the Public Works Committees 
had experience with water resources programs under their jurisdic­
tions. They anticipated similar interagency relationships would 
emerge under NEPA. By law, proposals for water resource projects to 
be constructed by federal agencies are submitted to other interested 
federal agencies and to concerned states for review and comment. 
The rivalry among federal water agencies is legendary, and the 
interest of the states in such projects is intense. Consequently, the 
comments from the interagency review process have often been 
critical, have displayed in-depth technical analysis, and have been a 
most fruitful source of questions for the examiners of the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Congressional committees. 
Congressional intent concerning the scope of actions to which 
NEPA was to apply and how statements were to be prepared is 
difficult to divine. The words of the Act are vague: 
-The entire Section 102 was qualified by the Senate-House con­
ferees with the phrase "to the fullest extent possible."
-Statements were to be prepared for "major federal actions signif­
icantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
Also,
-"Alternatives" to the proposal are to be described. 
The interpretations of each of these and other turns of phrase have 
been argued endlessly, and the meager official legislative history 
sheds little light upon intent. 
Generality of wording, however, was unavoidable, since the Act 
was intended to apply to numerous agencies and programs. No 
precise procedures or definitions could be cast in statutory language 
which would be applicable to such dissimilar undertakings as con-
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struction of a major airport, a change in grazing regulations on public 
lands, the licensing activity of a regulatory commission, and granting 
research funds. 
Procedural details were left for executive rulemaking, as is 
customarily the case. The conferees said that "the President was to 
prepare a list of those agencies ... " which would participate in the 
review of impact statements and to establish a time limitation for 
receipt of comments from federal, state, and local agencies.2 1 Pre­
sumably, similar executive amplifications of the impact statement 
procedure-regarding such matters as the definition of a "major 
action," retroactive applicability, occasions for generic rather than 
specific statements, and other considerations-were anticipated. 
There are few clues in the legislative history concerning what 
NEPA's Congressional authors expected impact statements to look 
like. Although the language of the act specifies "a detailed state­
ment," the most active participants probably had different things in 
mind. Some of the conferees were concerned that the process might 
become cumbersome and delay the implementation of programs. The 
few exhortations in the Conference Report that such delays be 
avoided now appear naive. 
It is certainly true, however, that the conferees never contem­
plated anything so extravagant as the multiple volume dissertations 
which now are commonly produced. This contention is bolstered by 
the fact that NEPA made no provision for funding extensive addi­
tional work by the federal agencies. 
A PARTICIPANT'S PERSPECTIVE OF NEPA IN PRACTICE 
The atmosphere in which a policy is implemented is often quite 
different from that in which it is formulated. Typically, the coalition 
of interests responsible for passage of a policy through Congress falls 
apart, and the subsequent support for implementing policy is less 
strong. It has been noted that the Congressional designers anticipated 
a hostile environment for the Act's application. In fact, this unfavor­
able reception did not materialize. When the language of the Act is 
read in light of subsequent events, it leads inevitably to the style of 
implementation which occurred. 
In the early years of implementing the requirement for impact 
statements, three developments occurred which transformed them 
from a force operating from inside program administration (as 
anticipated by the original drafters) to a force exerted from outside 
21. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st Cong. 1st
Sess. 8-9 (1969). 
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by interest groups and courts. These included the explosion of the 
environmental movement, the emergence of environmental law firms, 
and the assumption by the CEQ of the role of monitor of the EIS 
process. 
With Earth Day, which was celebrated four months after the 
passage of NEPA, the environmental issue burst into the crisis stage in 
American public opinion. During the time the legislation was being 
considered, the environmental issue was at what Anthony Downs 
calls the pre-problem stage.2 2 Although some legislators and the 
environmental vanguard were articulating a need for environmental 
management, there was no general public consciousness of environ­
mental concepts. Prior to 1970 issues were taken up in discrete 
fashion: opposing dams in the Grand Canyon, saving the Redwoods, 
rescuing the scenic Hudson, etc. As the era of the environment 
emerged, many issues were tied together as examples of a more 
general problem. The public activity involved in each instance of the 
general environmental problem was greatly enlarged and insistent 
upon positive action. Many government agencies were called upon to 
do something effective. The President, once hostile to NEPA, 
embraced it and appointed committed environmentalists to the CEQ. 
As a consequence, there was much more outside pressure and much 
less bureaucratic resistence than the designers of NEPA expected in 
the preparation and review of impact statements. 
The advent of a national environmental ethic was accompanied by 
a proliferation of environmentally-oriented legal firms whose expen­
sive legal work was underwritten by the Ford Foundation and other 
donors. As noted earlier, the architects of NEPA clearly foresaw a 
role for the courts in enforcing environmental policy. Landmark 
cases predated the enactment of NEPA, such as the High Mountain 
Sheep Dam on the middle Snake River2 3 and Storm King Mountain 
pumped storage powerplant on the Hudson,2 4 but these were infre­
quent and associated only with prominent issues. No one in the 
NEPA policymaking process, however, could have forseen that talent 
and funds would become available to pursue hundreds of cases 
involving matters of purely regional or even local concern. A result of 
the expanded legal action was that almost any environmental impact 
statement might be challenged in the courts. The courts, in turn, 
generally took a critical attitude toward agency compliance with the 
Act. 
22. A. Downs, Up and Down With Ecology: The "Issue-Attention Cycle," 28 Pub. Inter­
est 38-50 (Summer 1972). 
23. Udall v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
24. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n. 453 F.2d 463,
492 (Second Cir. 1971). 
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The shape of NEPA implementation also was greatly influenced by 
the President's decision to delegate to the newly-established CEQ 
responsibility for issuing guidelines for agency implementation of 
NEPA. Such a delegation was by no means necessary; in fact, legisla­
tive history indicates that the designers thought the Bureau of the 
Budget would supervise the 102 process, just as it served as overseer 
of benefit-cost evaluations.2 5 On the one hand, the role of CEQ as 
umpire of the NEPA process has further diversified its often conflict­
ing roles as a monitor of the nation's environmental health,. advisor 
to the President, and public ombudsman,2 6 and these built-in con­
tradictions have hampered the agency in the performance of its tasks. 
On the other hand, CEQ handling of NEPA has marked the process 
with the Council's particular perspective. Unlike the Bureau of the 
Budget (now 0MB), which is responsible to the President alone, CEQ 
is dependent upon environmental groups for political support. It is 
likely that CEQ has been less sensitive to the dynamics of organiza­
tion and administration and more sympathetic to environmental 
political forces and to public participation than the central budgeting 
agency would have been. 
Modification of the initial action-forcing concept which began 
with the Muskie-Jackson compromises was greatly extended by the 
events just chronicled. The initial approach-a formal "finding" by 
the responsible official-was intended to internalize the influence of 
environmental concerns upon agency decisionmaking. Changes in 
legislative language combined with environmental activism have 
served to transform the impact statement process into a tool for 
"external," public participatory policymaking. The change has had a 
number of unfortunate, dysfunctional consequences. 
Because of CEQ guidelines and court action, environmental impact 
statements were required for actions in which decisions had already 
been made and to which administrative agencies were already com­
mitted. The consequences of this retroactive application, however 
desirable it might be in the abstract, profoundly affected early imple­
mentation of the Act. It created instantly an incredible backlog of 
impact statements which had to be prepared on what were essentially 
irrevocable decisions-projects under construction, programs under 
way, and the like. 
More significantly, it was often these advanced actions and pro­
posals which set the unfortunate tone for early implementation of 
NEPA. Militant environmental groups grasped the opportunities for 
25. See, e.g., remarks in Senate National Environmental Policy, Hearings at 117-124.
26. R. Llroff, The Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Law Rep.
50051-70 (1973). 
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one more delaying action in conflicts they had previously lost. Agen­
cies found themselves rationalizing commitments to actions which 
they had no practicable abilities to modify or reverse. The best 
talents in the agencies were devoted to defending old decisions made 
before full consideration of their environmental impacts was re­
quired. 
Because of litigation, CEQ guidelines and public participation, 
environmental impact statements have become too long, disjointed 
and complex. The earliest environmental impact statements prepared 
pursuant to the Act were perfunctory affairs. One (related to a land 
use permit for a road from the Yukon River to the north slope of 
Alaska) was only eight typewritten pages long, including discussion 
of alternatives. Another (relating to Corps of Engineers dredging 
programs in the Great Lakes) required only three pages. The proper 
balance between these early documents which contained too little 
information, and efforts prepared today, which threaten information 
overload, has yet to be struck. 
The courts and CEQ's guidelines have applied two interpretations 
to environmental impact statements which probably were not antic­
ipated or intended by the authors of  the provision: 
(I) They look upon the statements as comprehensive decision docu­
ments; and
(2) They view the statements as evidence of whether the agency is
complying with other provisions of NEPA.
As indicated by a specific reference in the Conference Report, 
Section 102(2)(c) was patterned after the 90-day review process re­
quired for water resource projects. There was an implicit assumption 
by the authors that, as in the case of a water project, any major 
proposal would already have been justified by economic evaluations 
and that the objectives and alternatives of the proposal would have 
been identified and described in the course of formulation. The 
impact statement, therefore, need only amplify environmental 
considerations which might otherwise have been overlooked. 
As the Act was applied to programs dissimilar from water 
resources, such as licensing actions of the Atomic Energy Commis­
sion, it became clear that the analysis and justifications for many 
federal decisions were not being documented in any formal way. At 
least there was no basic decision document upon which the logic of 
the proposal itself could be weighed by the public or the courts. 
Environmentalists, who had been frustrated for years by their 
inability to obtain written analyses supporting governmental deci­
sions, sought to have a written account of the entire decision process 
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included in environmental statements. The courts, sharing a need for 
information, agreed. CEQ in its November 1971 guidelines deter­
mined that "Environmental statements will be documents complete 
enough to stand on their own. "2 7 
Certainly, there is a need for public documentation of important 
governmental decisions, and the complexity of such decisions re­
quires that the documentation be voluminous and costly. The body 
of policy concerning the public right to information appears to be 
deficient in that it relates only to already prepared documents and 
does not require gathering information in a public disclosure docu­
ment; it also does not prescribe the level of detail required. The 
responsibility has been imposed upon NEPA in this instance to en­
force the fundamental public right to freedom of information con­
cerning governmental activities. Environmental policies probably are 
being unfairly burdened with the costs of this extra public service 
and unfairly criticized for the required effort. 
A final and perhaps most dangerous dysfunctional consequence 
has been that of delay. The external process into which the EIS has 
evolved defies the expressed intent of the Act's authors that it be 
efficient. The diversity of the participants, the independence of 
litigants and the judiciary, and the delays which legal actions neces­
sarily entail militate against expedited decisionmaking and deprive 
the responsible officials of control over timetables. 
Some of the greatest strengths and most dangerous weaknesses of 
NEPA stem from this transformation. The checks provided by out­
side participants obviously preclude expedient action by agency offi­
cials in response to parochial or political motives. Alternatively, the 
process can be unresponsive to real needs for timely federal action. 
Honest disagreements by courts or litigants or cynical delaying action 
by interest groups could frustrate proposals which are supported by 
the general public. 
Most criticism of NEPA has been presented as opposition to un­
justified and costly delays. Until recently, however, the critics have 
had very little public credibility. With the currently increasing con­
cern over energy supplies and economic stagnation, however, the 
situation could change dramatically. 
Current energy problems and the economic crisis facing the nation 
have greatly reduced public enthusiasm for environmental constraints 
upon constructive economic activity. The news media have notably 
mitigated their partisan treatment of environmental issues. Oppo-
27. Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 36 Fed. Reg. 23667
(December 11, 1971). 
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nents of NEPA, it would appear, now have an opportunity to attack 
it effectively. Like Frankenstein's monster, the ultimate threat to 
NEPA lies in the possible disaffection of its creator. There is no 
question that Congress had something far less awesome in mind when 
it fashioned the act. Thus, the future holds two possibilities for 
NEPA'. If Congress, dissatisfied with NEPA's implementation, sub­
stantially amends it, the result might be a conscious tradeoff of 
greater environmental degradation in return for other public benefits. 
On the other hand, if the public does not agree to such modification, 
then NEPA is likely to continue to be an unusual example of policy­
making in which impact exceeds expectations . 
